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ABSTRACT
We propose a definition of critical 
infrastructure deterrence and develop a 
methodology to explicitly quantify the 
deterrent effects of critical infrastructure 
security strategies.  We leverage historical 
work on analyzing deterrence,  game theory 
and utility theory. Our methodology 
quantifies deterrence as the extent to  which 
an attacker’s expected utility from an 
infrastructure attack  changes  after a 
defender has  invested to deter attacks, as 
compared to their expected utility  absent 
deterrence.  We derive expected utilities  from 
a modified game theory approach, which 
uses probabilistic utility functions,  wherein 
utility  function probabilities are functions  of 
investment.  We vary these functions  based 
on different information availability 
assumptions  (e.g., perfect vs imperfect 
attacker information). We produce evidence 
that it is quantifiably more  advantageous to 
overtly deter, rather than conceal security 
information,  under specific conditions.  We 
also leverage these utility  functions to 
determine  the unconditional risk to  a 
defender if deterrence strategies  fail,  and we 
determine cost efficiency of those strategies. 
INTRODUCTION
DHS policy  advocates investing  in critical 
infrastructure (CI) protection to deter 
t e r r o r i s t  a t t a c k s . 1  T h e N a t i o n a l 
Infrastructure Protection Plan is replete with 
references to deterrence,  most  notably  on 
page 38: “account for  the adversary’s ability 
to recognize the target  and the deterrence 
value of existing  security  measures.”  Also, 
Homeland Security  Presidential Directive 
(HSPD) 7  emphasizes deterrence of CI 
attacks.2  Since DHS also advocates 
quantitative terrorism  risk analysis,  to 
support  the goal to deter  attacks, DHS would 
benefit  from  a  methodology  to quantify  the 
deterrence value of CI terrorism  risk 
reduction  investments in  a  way  that 
complements and enhances exist ing 
traditional approaches to risk analysis.  Also, 
DHS would benefit from  a  working  definition 
of CI deterrence,  the lack of which  is 
identified by Morral and Jackson.3 
Given  this policy  context,  various elements 
within  DHS have begun  efforts to analyze 
deterrence,  or  influence adversary  decision-
making  before a  CI attack is executed. This 
necessarily  involves considering human 
factors; specifically, thinking  about  the 
adversary’s approach  to terrorism  planning. 
For example,  the US Coast Guard,  in 
conjunction with  the University  of Southern 
California’s Center  for  Risk  and Economic 
Analysis of Terrorism  Events (CREATE),  has 
begun  the development  of PROTECT,  a 
model intended to help Coast Guard units 
deter  adversary  planning by  patrolling CI in  a 
random  fashion.4  Recent  work  at  the Naval 
Postgraduate School  in  Monterey, CA  has 
produced a  model  that measures the 
resiliency  of supply  chains,  accounting for 
perceived attacker preferences for disrupting 
a  supply  chain  and increasing  commodity 
shipment costs.5  Additionally, DHS Science 
and Technology  (S&T) recently  undertook a 
r e v i e w  o f m u l t i p l e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l 
approaches to enhancing  traditional risk 
analysis by  incorporating  insights from 
intelligent adversary  modeling,  which 
accounts for adversary planning and goals.6  
While  well intentioned and promising, 
these efforts do not explicitly  quantify 
deterrence in  the context of critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP) or  explain 
how  to incorporate measurable deterrence 
into CIP risk  equations to show  the CI risk 
reduction effects of deterrence.7  If DHS 
components are to implement  policies to 
deter  attacks, eventually  they  may  be asked to 
account to Congress on  how  they  are 
measuring  the effect iveness of that 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  a n d h o w  t h a t 
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implementation plays with  traditional risk 
reduction.  At  present, some DHS agencies 
such  as the US Coast  Guard report  risk-based 
performance metrics without  explicitly 
accounting for  measurable deterrence. 
Looking  ahead,  it  is possible that the Coast 
Guard and other  DHS agencies will have to 
start  reporting  deterrence effectiveness and 
resulting  risk reduction accounting for  this 
effectiveness. 8 This is our  present  motivation 
to develop a  quantitative approach  to 
deterrence measurement and to develop a 
method to incorporate that  approach  into 
traditional CIP risk analysis.
In  the spirit  of this DHS emphasis on 
deterrence,  and assuming  DHS components 
may  eventually  have to report  measures of 
effectiveness,  we propose that CI deterrence 
can  be quantified as the extent  to which  an 
attacker’s intent  to attack  a  CI target  changes. 
This change is a  result  of changes in  expected 
utility  from  a  potential  attack on  a  CI after  a 
CI defender  attempts to deter  an  attack, as 
compared to what the attacker’s expected 
utility  from  a potential  attack would have 
been  before the defender deterred.  Utility  is 
the value of an outcome. 
Our  approach is intended to complement 
existing,  traditional CIP risk  analysis tools, 
not replace them. In fact, our  approach relies 
on  input  from  reputable risk analysis tools. 
Our  example of how  we apply  this approach 
focuses on  deterring  terrorism. However, as 
long  as existing  risk  analysis tools or  best 
practices can  be used to analyze the threat, 
vulnerability, and consequences of other 
intentional hazards such as sabotage and 
theft,  our  general principles can be applied to 
measuring  deterrence value of measures 
against any  sort  of attack  on  a  CI.  Indeed, 
some of our  literature review  will examine 
how  deterrence principles,  which  we leverage 
in  our  own  approach, have been  applied to 
issues other  than  terrorism.  Importantly, our 
approach  does not consider  unintentional 
threats to these CIKR such  as natural 
disasters or  industrial  accidents9.  Finally, our 
approach  incorporates elements of the DHS 
prevent,  protect,  respond, and recover 
approach, consistent with  Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8.10 
DETERRENCE AND RISK: 
MUTUALLY INCLUSIVE IN 
THEORY
Deterrent tactics include investments to 
reduce at tacker  expected ut i l i ty  by 
influencing  attacker  capability,  target 
vulnerability,  and target consequence. These 
terms, along  with  intent  to attack,  make up 
the basic DHS risk  equation  Risk=T*V*C. 
Risk  is expected loss to a  CI defender from  a 
potential CI attack,  but this loss constitutes 
part of an  attacker’s gain,  or  utility. This 
equation incorporates all aspects of 
prevention protection, response and recovery 
as articulated in  HSPD-8: reducing  threat is 
preventing  an  attack, reducing  vulnerability 
is protecting against  an attack, and reducing 
consequences is responding to and 
recovering  from  an  attack.  Thus, if we 
measure deterrence as a  function  of changing 
components of threat, vulnerability  and 
consequence, our deterrence efforts 
encompass the entire HSPD-8 spectrum.
By  influencing  these components of 
attacker  utility,  a  defender may  attempt to 
influence an  attacker’s belief that the costs of 
an  attack  outweigh  the benefits or  utility,  or 
that  the probability  of successful attack is too 
low, so they  don’t  execute that course of 
action (COA). This is operational deterrence 
as proposed by  Morral  and Jackson. 11 Thus, 
deterrence strategies must convince the 
attacker  than  if they  execute a  certain  COA, it 
will yield benefits less than those yielded by 
their  best  course of action  without 
deterrence. Hence,  these strategies must 
account for  our  attackers’ goals as well as our 
own,  as long  as we can  influence their 
perspective on  attaining their  goals. This 
lends to a  game theory  approach  to 
quantifying  deterrence.  If we determine 
changes in  attacker  expected utility  in  a  game 
theory  format,  we can  measure change in 
intent and thus can measure deterrence. 
Deterrence thus inherently  includes our 
adversary’s assessment  of their  risk, or 
perceived reduction in utility, as well  as our 
assessment of our  own  risk.  Ultimately,  when 
deliberating  deterrence strategies, we want  to 
know  answers to three questions: (1)  what  is 
the extent to which  the attacker  is deterred, 
(2) what is the risk reduction,  or  change in 
expected defender  loss resulting  from  that 
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deterrence strategy; and (3)  what  are the cost 
implications,  or  defender  deterrence 
investment  efficiency,  of that  deterrence 
strategy.  All answers must be quantifiable to 
be useful in  quantitative deterrence analysis 
and terrorism  risk management.  Taken 
together,  deterrence quantification, defender 
expected loss as a result of that  quantifiable 
deterrence, and defender  investment 
efficiency  constitute a  deterrence “portfolio” 
of criteria  a  defender  must  consider.  This 
portfolio would support  existing  CIKR 
security  plans and risk analysis with 
additional rigor and measurable deterrence 
effect data.
GENERAL FORM OF OUR 
DETERRENCE QUANTIFICATION 
EQUATION
Formally,  quantifiable CI deterrence 
effectiveness of an  lth  defender  deterrence 
course  of action (COA) given  an  attacker’s kth 
post-deterrence action,  is the difference 
between attacker  pre-deterrence intent, 
which  we denote , or  probability  an 
attacker  desires to attack  a certain  target, and 
attacker  post-deterrence intent  , 
which  is then  normalized by  the pre-
deterrence intent. The i and k  subscripts 
denote specific  attacker  COA; i is an 
attacker’s pre-deterrence COA  and k is an 
attacker’s post-deterrence COA. This is 
shown in Equation 1.
Equation 1. Quantification of deterrence
These intent  values are functions of 
attacker  expected utilities from  an attack. 
These expected utility  values are outputs of a 
deterrence game in a game theory format.  
For  the attacker, expected utilities are 
probabilities of an  attack succeeding  given  it 
is already  desired (attacker  capability 
multiplied by  target  vulnerability),  multiplied 
by  the maximum  utility  (in  dollars)  if the 
attack  were to succeed.  The attacker’s utility 
or  defender’s consequence is a combination 
of deaths12  and economic  consequence (in 
dollars of annualized profit for  that  target), 
and the economic consequence is multiplied 
by  a mitigation  factor  based on  the extent  to 
which  the defender  could mitigate that 
economic consequence if an  attack was 
successful. 
Threat  is generally  attacker  intent  * 
attacker  capability; our  methodology  only 
incorporates the capability  part  of the 
traditional threat  probability  equation  in  the 
attacker  expected utility  function.  This is 
because we treat intent  as the output  of our 
expected utility  calculation  methodology, 
rather  than  an  input, but  we apply  intent  into 
the defender’ s unconditional risk equation  to 
reflect  how  CI risk  changes given quantifiable 
deterrence so as not  to wholly  depart  from  a 
traditional risk  analysis approach. We now 
elaborate on  our  approach  to leveraging 
threat with utility functions.
OUR PHILOSOPHY ON THREAT AND 
UTILITY FUNCTIONS
T h e r i s k  e q u a t i o n  R ( r i s k ) = T V C 
(threat*vulnerability*consequence) is the 
general  standard for  CIKR risk analysis 
because it  has a  threat  component.  There are 
n u m e r o u s v u l n e r a b l e a n d h i g h l y 
consequential CIKR in  the US, and leveraging 
threat judgments helps differentiate and 
reduce the defender’s workload based on  the 
likelihood that  an  attacker may  prefer  some 
target  types more than  others. However, that 
threat  is often  high  level and strategic,13 
without  accounting for  target nuances that 
may  influence attacker  perception  of specific 
target  attractiveness. Incorporating  our 
quantifiable deterrence,  as a  function  of 
intent changes based on  individual target 
expected attacker  utility,  adds this nuance 
and we believe this more accurately 
represents unconditional risk.
We claim  that intent  is not  critical 
component of an  attacker  expected utility 
function.  We invest  to deter  and influence 
desirability  or  intent.  Traditionally, intent is 
an  input  to the standard risk equation,  as a 
component of threat. However, we claim  that 
desirability  is a  function  of attacker  beliefs 
about  probability  of successful  attack 
initiation,  execution, consummation, and 
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consequence of that  consummation. 14 Thus, 
deterrence investments must  influence these 
factors,  but  desirability  or  intent  is an 
outcome of that  process. Intent then need not 
be included in  probabilistic risk  functions or 
utility functions in a deterrence game.
There are those, such  as Louis Cox  who 
believe that  threat,  or  intent  and capability  to 
attack,  should be an  outcome of a 
probabilistic  risk analysis product  rather  than 
an  input. 15 The outcome of the games in  our 
research  will  result in  intent  probabilities.  We 
will show  that only  intent  need be an 
outcome; we believe that  capabil ity 
probabilities should remain  inputs within  a 
risk or  utility  equation. Intent  is still useful  in 
a  CIKR risk equation  when  considering  how 
to allocate resources based on risk, from  the 
defender  perspective only. This means if we 
don’t explicitly  consider  deterrence effects,  or 
changes in  attacker  intent  as a  result  of 
changing  expected utility,  we can  justifiably 
leave intent in the risk equation. 
Excluding intent, expected loss should 
include capability, or  the probability  an 
attacker  can  initiate an  attack. The defender 
invests in offensive, counterterrorism  actions 
to reduce attacker  capability  to initiate  and 
execute an  attack.  This is one aspect of 
investing  to deter.  If capability  reduction 
investments fail,  the attacker  is not  deterred 
because they  believe a  high  probability  that 
the attack can  be initiated.  But, expected loss 
should also include the probability  that  the 
attack  can be successfully  executed, and will 
bring about a  consequence to the target once 
consummated, which  are components of 
vulnerability. If vulnerability  investments 
fail, the attacker  is not deterred because they 
may  believe a  high  probability  that  the attack, 
once initiated,  can  be executed and 
consummated.
Finally,  expected loss must include 
consequence, but  only  to the extent  it  is not 
reduced by  defender  recoverability  and 
redundancy  measures. 16  These measures 
constitute the final  aspect  of investing  to 
deter, because if the attacker  believes any 
consequence will  be quickly  mitigated, they 
may  be deterred as they  may  not  achieve 
their goals.
Thus, expected utility  functions in  a 
deterrence game must  include capability 
probabilities,  vulnerability  probabilities, 
m a x i m u m  c o n s e q u e n c e v a l u e s , a n d 
probabilities of consequence mitigation. 
Intent or  desirability  probabilities are not 
needed. If intent probabilities were included 
in expected loss equations, since intent 
reflects the desirability  to carry  out  an  attack, 
and desirability  is a  function  of probability  of 
successful init iat ion,  execution and 
consummation,  then  we would be double 
counting the deterrent  effects of defender 
investment in  those expected utility 
functions. Thus, our  expected utility 
functions will treat  expected utility  as a 
conditional probability: they  reflect  the 
expected utility  of attack,  if the attack  already 
desires to attack, or intent=100%. 
DETERRENCE AND RISK: 
MUTUALLY INCLUSIVE IN 
PRACTICE
Our  utility  functions upon  which  the intent 
values in  Equation  1  are based, account  for 
t h e t r a d i t i o n a l 
risk=threat*vulnerability*consequence 
approach. In  fact,  our  methodology  depends 
on  traditional risk  analysis tools to provide 
this input; it  cannot function without  existing 
risk=TVC  tools such  as the Coast  Guard’s 
Maritime Security  Risk Analysis Model 
(MSRAM), 17 TRAM,  CARVER, or  any  legacy 
probabilistic CI risk analysis tool that 
leverages threat, vulnerability, consequence, 
and mitigation  data.  Thus, our  methodology 
is not  intended to supplant  existing 
probabilistic  CI risk  methodologies and tools, 
but  complement them  and extend their 
functionality.  Additionally,  myriad CI 
protection  efforts such  as Design  Basis Threat 
analysis , Crime Prevention  through 
Environmental Design,  and others can  easily 
be leveraged with  our proposed methodology, 
as they  contribute to our  understanding  of 
threat,  vulnerability  and consequence-all 
critical input for  our  methodological 
approach. Thus, even  if a  CIP best  practice is 
not formally  considered a  risk  assessment 
tool  or  methodology, if that  practice produces 
data  that  can  meet  the basic  definition  of 
threat, vulnerability, or  consequence, then  its 
input could be leveraged by  our  deterrence 
quantification methodology.
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Equation  1  will  help us answer  the first 
deterrence strategy  question.  The deterrence 
game that  produces those utilities that 
support  intent values in  Equation  1  can also 
produce defender  risk equations, which  can 
be compared to answer  the second deterrence 
strategy  question.  Further,  attacker  and 
defender  utilities must  be modeled as 
funct ions of a t tacker and defender 
investment, since return on  investment  is 
critical for  risk-informed decision  making. 18 
This will  help answer  the third deterrence 
strategy question. 
Also, Equation  1  can be applied to quantify 
deterrence subject  to specific  theoretical 
analysis options for  how  a  CI defender  and an 
attacker  perceive the utility  of different COA. 
T h e s e a n a l y s i s o p t i o n s i n c l u d e ( 1 ) 
assumptions about  information availability 
circumstances, or the extent to which  an 
attacker  knows what a  defender  is doing  to 
defend their  CI; (2)  different  utility  theory 
assumptions,  or  assumptions about  people 
assess information  and make decisions about 
the value of an  outcome; and (3) assumptions 
about  how  risk  probabilities are reduced with 
defender investment. 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND 
USEFULNESS OF THIS APPROACH
WHY SHOULD WE HAVE THE ABILITY 
TO QUANTIFY DETERRENCE?
This quantitative approach can  be applied to 
real-world CI protection.  Since we are 
quantifying deterrence in  a  way  that  will 
leverage traditional  probabilistic CI risk data, 
those involved in CI protection  can  report  a 
different metric  to our  policymakers, in a  way 
that  reinterprets the effect  of CI attack 
capability,  vulnerability  and consequence 
mitigation measures.
To explain,  the current  performance 
metric  that  DHS components report  on  is 
how  much risk, or  expected loss, we have 
reduced to CI by  implementing  vulnerability 
and consequence reduction measures.  The 
focus is on how  these measures would defeat 
an  attack already  in  progress,  or  how  they 
would mitigate effects after  the attack. 
However,  if we leverage this same data  to 
quantify  the deterrent  value of those 
measures, we could instead report  how  we 
believe we have changed the attacker’s 
expected utility  from  an  attack, and thus have 
c h a n g e d t h e i r  i n t e n t t o a t t a c k ,  b y 
implementing  these measures. Thus,  we gain 
insights into how  risk changes based on  our 
adversary’s interpretation of our  defenses, 
and we have now  accounted for  an  intelligent 
adversary. This is the reinterpretation  of the 
e f f e c t s o f o u r  c u r r e n t m e a s u r e s , 
contextualized for policy  that requires both 
risk analysis and deterrence.  Also, current 
risk methodologies generally  only  account for 
a n e n g i n e e r i n g a p p r o a c h  t o r i s k 
management, as they  focus primarily  on  the 
details of vulnerability  and consequence. 
They  include threat as well, but  often  this is a 
very  high-level , non  specif ic threat 
probability  estimation.  So,  our  methodology 
will account  for  more tactical aspects of 
threat  probabilities,  such  as how  individual 
target  engineering  characteristics such as 
security  measures actually  influence the 
attacker’s interest in  attacking, and thus 
threat  judgments can  be more granular  and 
target-specific.
That  said,  it seems necessary  to be able to 
incorporate our  quantitative deterrence 
effectiveness results back into the standard 
risk=TVC equation. There are theoretical 
challenges with  this,  but we believe they  are 
easily  overcome. In  brief,  adopting  our 
deterrence quantification methodology  and 
incorporating  its results in  back  into 
traditional probabilistic risk=TVC, where T 
represents intent and capability,  might seem 
to double count  the effects of our capability, 
vulnerability,  and consequence factor 
reduction deterrent  measures.  It  would count 
those deterrence effects once against  those 
factors themselves,  and again in  intent. 
However,  we claim  that  unconditional risk, or 
risk including the probability  the attacker 
desired to attack  after  deterrence measures 
are implemented, appropriately  double-
counts the effects of those deterrence 
investments: once in  the reduction of 
capability, vulnerability,  and/or  consequence, 
and again  in  intent.  We must  account for  the 
likelihood the attacker  wants to attack, and 
the likelihood of success if they  do initiate an 
attack.  The current form  of risk  used for  CIP 
is unconditional  risk where we believe the 
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intent probability  modifies conditional risk, 
a n d c o n d i t i o n a l r i s k i s 
capability*vulnerability*consequence: the 
expected loss given  an  attack is already 
desired with 100% intent.  
This approach  is useful for  a wide 
audience: academics who will consider  the 
technical  aspects of our methodology,  CIP 
practitioners who may  implement the 
deterrence measures that  inform  our 
methodology  once the methodology  is 
accepted within academia; and DHS agencies 
who must  report  performance effectiveness 
measures to Congress and other  oversight 
bodies after practitioners have implemented 
the measures.
We expound on  how  we incorporate 
measurable deterrence into the traditional 
risk equation  in a  case study  example.  We 
also give examples of how  to apply  this 
methodology  to notional  real world CI in  a 
subsequent  section  of this research. Finally, 
we give examples of how  quantifiable 
deterrence effectiveness might change given 
d i f f e r e n t i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b i l i t y 
circumstances,  as that  seems the most 
practical of the theoretical  analysis options 
we have introduced: a  practitioner naturally 
wants to know  whether  they  should make 
their  security  measures overt  or  covert to 
deter! The other  two analysis options are 
areas of interest but  we do not  give examples 
of how  deterrence effectiveness might  change 
if those options are varied; we save this for 
future research.  We discuss the theories 
behind those analysis options briefly  in  our 
analysis of the need for  these  options and our 
literature review.
WHY THE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
OPTIONS? DIFFERENT DETERRENCE 
EFFECTIVENESS DATA MAY RESULT
Equation  1  can  be applied to quantify 
deterrence subject  to specific  theoretical 
analysis options for  how  a  CI defender  and an 
attacker  perceive the utility  of different COA. 
These analysis options include assumptions 
about  information  availability  circumstances, 
or  the extent to which  an attacker  knows 
what  a  defender is doing to defend their  CI. 
In  game theory  modeling,  whether  actors 
have perfect (known) or  imperfect  (unknown) 
information  about their  opponents is critical 
to understanding  the game’s outcomes.  Since 
we will be leveraging  principles from  game 
theory  in  our  approach, we focus on  this 
analysis option.  These theoretical analysis 
options also include different  utility  theory 
assumptions, or  how  assumptions about 
people assess information and make 
decisions about  the value of an  outcome. 
Nikhil Dighe et.  al.  urge that  future work on 
analyzing  deterrence investment should 
consider  a l ternat ives to t radi t ional 
rationality, or  subjective expected utility 
(SEU). 19 Utility  functions can  assume either 
(SEU) or  an  alternative,  prospect  utility 
theory (PU). 
Finally,  these analysis options include 
assumptions about  how  risk is reduced with 
defender  investment. In theory, probabilities 
of attack  success may  change linearly  with 
investment, but  in  reality,  the relationship 
may  be an  exponentia l  funct ion of 
investment; it  becomes increasingly  difficult 
to reduce risk as more risk  is reduced. Dighe 
et. al.  advocate exploration of the effects of 
security  investments when  those investments 
do not reduce the success probability  of 
attacks to zero. 20  This nonlinearity  can  be 
observed in  engineering  problems; for  CI 
security  measures,  both  engineering  factors 
and social factors such  as public  resistance to 
increased security  may  contribute to 
nonlinearity.
T h e p r a c t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f 
experimenting with  the different theoretical 
analysis options are numerous. Uncertainties 
f a c i n g  a n  a t t a c k e r  a r e c r i t i c a l  t o 
understanding  deterrence,  but  are rarely 
leveraged in  game-theoretic analysis of 
counterterrorism. 21  We have done initial 
work  on  this and have produced evidence 
suggesting  whether  it  is more advantageous 
for  a  CI defender  to make defensive 
investments unknown, or  imperfect,  to 
would-be attackers rather  than  perfectly 
known. The defender  advantage in  such  cases 
would be lower  average unconditional  risk 
after  deterrence under  specific  information 
availability circumstances. 
If evidence supports an  advantage in 
deterrence effectiveness under  imperfect 
information  circumstances, implications are 
that  a  government should consider classifying 
its CI defensive investments and any  analysis 
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o f h o w  t h o s e i n v e s t m e n t s r e d u c e 
infrastructure vulnerability  and consequence. 
Conversely,  i f evidence supports an 
advantage of perfect information, a 
government  should instead act ively 
communicate to would-be CI attackers not 
only  its defensive investments but  also 
d e t a i l e d c a l c u l a t i o n s o f h o w  t h o s e 
investments reduce vulnerability  and 
consequence.  This approach  assumes the 
attacker  believes the defender’s disclosure of 
investment  and effectiveness information  is 
accurate. 
In  order  to generalize these findings, any 
advantage of a  specif ic information 
availability  circumstance must be robust 
given  different  utility  theory  assumptions, 
and also given different  probability-
investment  relationship assumptions. 
Behavioral science and historical research 
support  the need to analyze decision  making 
under nonlinear  or  biased circumstances and 
thus examine different  assumptions about 
utility  when we analyze deterrence.  Nonlinear 
engineering  phenomena  support the need to 
analyze how  system  performance,  or  CI 
attacker  capability,  vulnerability,  and 
consequence mitigation in CIP research, 
changes nonlinearly  as a function  of effort  or 
investment  expended. We do not  give 
examples of sustained defender  advantage 
from  a  specific information  availability 
circumstance across these different analysis 
option  assumptions in this paper,  but this is 
an area for future research.
DISCUSSION OF RELEVANT 
WORK
We now  examine relevant work to create 
context for  our  general methodology  to 
quantify  CI deterrence,  and for  our specific 
theoretical  analysis options. We integrate 
different aspects of this work with  our own 
techniques into a  methodology  to quantify  CI 
deterrence and create a  deterrence portfolio. 
There is historical  work  to measure 
deterrence effects in  other  areas,  including 
fishery  enforcement, drug  smuggling, and 
aviation  terrorism,  but  DHS currently  lacks a 
methodology  to explicitly  quantify  CI 
terrorism  deterrence. However, there is 
plenty  of research  on  quantitative risk 
measurement, analysis,  and management, 
which  suggests we should leverage 
quantitative risk to quantify deterrence.
RISK, RETURN ON INVESTMENT, AND 
DETERRENCE 
DHS defines risk as a  function  of threat, 
vulnerability,  and consequence.22  For 
terrorism, threat  is defined as the likelihood 
of an  attack being  initiated,  accounting  for 
both  adversary  intent  and capability.  Intent  is 
the probability  an  attack is desired, and 
capability  is the probability  it  can be 
executed.  Vulnerability  is the likelihood an 
attack  is successful given  it  is attempted. 
Finally,  consequences are the effects a 
terrorist  attack.  Thus, this approach  to 
analyzing  terrorism  risk is probabilistic in 
nature.  The probabilistic approach  to risk 
analysis has been widely  accepted for  some 
time.23 
Since DHS is using  probabilistic  risk 
analysis techniques for  counterterrorism,24 
the relationship between probabilistic  risk 
analysis and general  deterrence theory  must 
be examined before we attempt to quantify 
deterrence effectiveness of CI protection 
strategies. In  general,  there  is much 
precedent  for  integrating risk analysis with 
deterrence.  Richard Lebow  and Janet Stein 
propose that  deterrence effectiveness 
depends upon an actor’s attitude toward 
risk.25 Elaine Bunn advocates that deterrence 
policies must account for  adversary  attitudes 
toward risk.26 However,  these arguments are 
not  specifically  focused on CI attack 
deterrence, and contain  no explic i t 
quantitative calculations of probabilistic  risk 
that would support deterrence quantification. 
Other  literature focuses on  possible 
relationships between  CI risk  analysis and 
deterrence.  For  example, William  McGill and 
Bilal Ayyub claim  that  deterrence is a 
function  of infrastructure vulnerability,  a 
component of infrastructure risk.27  In  fact, 
the probability  an attack would be initiated, 
or  threat, is claimed to be a  function  of the 
perceived target attractiveness, and the target 
attractiveness is a  function  of the perceived 
probability  of success,  or  vulnerability. Thus, 
a  lower vulnerability  target means a less 
attractive target; a  less attractive target then 
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means a  lower  probability  of attack initiation; 
and a  lower  attack initiation  probability  then 
means the attacker  has been deterred. This 
suggests a  fundamental  relationship between 
probabilistic  risk and deterrence. We must 
now  examine deterrence theory  more closely 
and put our proposed definition  of CI 
deterrence measurement  in  context  of this 
historical discussion.
DETERRENCE THEORY 
Deterrence theory  has been  vigorously 
discussed and debated for  decades. Patrick 
and Audrey  Cronin  propose that  deterrence 
occurs when  an  actor  discourages aggression 
toward another  actor,  with  the intended 
outcome that the former  never  has to respond 
to aggressive action  by  the latter.28 In  other 
words,  the goal of deterrence is to convince 
an  adversary  to refrain from  aggressive 
action. Lebow  claims that  deterring  involves 
manipulating  an  adversary’s assessment of a 
situation  by  convincing  them  that  costs of 
acting  exceed benefits.29  Finally,  putting 
t h e o r y  i n t o p r a c t i c a l  g u i d a n c e t h e 
D e p a r t m e n t  o f D e f e n s e D e t e r r e n c e 
Operations Joint  Operating  Concept  specifies 
that  deterrence affects adversary  decision 
making  in  three ways: (1) imposing  costs on 
an  undesirable adversary  course of action; (2) 
denying the perceived benefits of such  a  COA; 
and (3) encouraging  restraint by  making it 
seem more attractive than action.30 
These approaches to deterrence suggest 
that  the only  way  to deter  is to convince an 
adversary  not  to attack.  But, applying  this 
approach  to deterring  terrorist  attacks on  CI 
is problematic for  two reasons.  One, the 
United States has so many  CI that  spending 
resources to prevent  attacks on  all  seems 
inefficient. Two, these deterrence theories 
were developed during the Cold War  when 
nation-states could be deterred by  threat of 
mutual ly  assured destruct ion.  With 
asymmetrical  warfare and terrorism, 
convincing our adversaries we can  eliminate 
them  is a  challenge since they  are difficult  to 
find. Thus,  a modified definition  of 
deterrence is needed for  CI protection. An  all-
or-nothing  approach  applied to DOD tactic 
(1) is impractical  because it is difficult to 
impose costs. For  (2),  denying  benefits would 
mean  defending all infrastructures, which  we 
attempt to do at  great  expense.  Finally, for 
(3), our  adversaries have stated their  intent to 
continue to attempt  to inflict damage; 
restraint will  likely  never  be acceptable to 
organizations such as Al-Qaeda  whose raison 
d’être is to inflict  damage upon the United 
States and its allies. Thus,  our  form  of 
deterrence for  CI protection – influencing an 
adversary’s decision making  process such 
that  their expected utility  from  attacking a  CI 
changes after  we deter  by  investing  – is 
appropriate.
The idea  of accepting  losses is not without 
precedent. For  example, John Major 
proposes the concept of equilibrium  expected 
loss (EEL): a  defender  moves resources to 
various high-risk  infrastructures,  making 
them  equally  unattractive to an  attacker and 
c r e a t i n g  a n E E L . A n y  u n p r o t e c t e d 
infrastructure,  if attacked, will yield a gain  to 
the attacker that is less than the EEL. 31  
Two critical  components of deterrence are 
credibility  and signaling.  Bunn  claims that 
credibility  is critical: to deter, we must be 
able to signal  to the adversary  we have both 
the credible capability  and the will to impose 
costs or  deny  benefits. 32  Thus,  for  CI 
deterrence,  a  terrorist  must  believe that  we 
can  deny  them  benefits by  defending  our 
infrastructure.  That belief can  be reinforced 
by  the terrorist’s own observations of our 
defenses,  and our explicit  signaling  of those 
defenses.  The former  type of reinforcement 
begs the question of whether the terrorist 
accurately  perceives our  defenses,  and the 
latter  begs the question of whether  the 
terrorist believes our  disclosures. These 
issues have been  researched; for  example 
Erik  Jenelius et.  al.  analyze the effects of 
adversary  perception  on their  decision 
making.33 The present research assumes that 
prior  to deterrent  investments at  the start  of a 
deterrence game,  all  information about the 
defender’s original  “pre-deterrence”  defenses 
is known  to an  attacker, and subsequent 
deterrence game outcomes determine how 
deterrence is quantified depending on 
whether the attacker  has perfect  or  imperfect 
information  about  the defender’s deterrence 
COA.  Thus, our signaling  of information 
should be a key  determinant  of how 
quantifiably  effective our  deterrence 
investments are. There is the possibility  that 
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an  attacker  could infer  weaknesses if we 
signal  prospective defenses before they  are 
implemented.  Importantly, we do not 
advocate actually  signaling the existence of 
security  or  response measures before they  are 
implemented.  We only  argue that when we 
are considering what  deterrence investments 
to implement,  we should determine whether 
making  those investments transparent  or 
obscured, once actually  implemented, would 
influence the attacker  more.  Also, we can run 
our  deterrence game simulation  with  as many 
CIKR targets as desired, using  computer 
programs if necessary, to account for the 
possibility  that  signaling  defenses at targets 
will focus the attacker  attention  elsewhere. 
We now  know  there is a  relationship between 
probabilistic  risk analysis and deterrence, 
and we have a  working definition  of CI attack 
deterrence as a  change in  attacker  intent. 
Thus, we will  use  a  probabilistic risk 
approach  to quantify  deterrence.  Next, we 
examine previous and ongoing efforts to 
analyze and quantify deterrence.
ANALYZING DETERRENCE 
There is a  considerable repository  of 
literature  offering  insights into how 
deterrence might  be quantified,  without ever 
explicitly  stating  how  to quantify  it  for CI 
protection. In  general, the literature shows 
that  analysis of drug smuggling,  fisheries law 
enforcement, critical infrastructure security, 
and aviation  security,  reveals that  lowering 
the chances of successful attack or  violation 
of a  law, and communicating the imposition 
of penalties if caught in  violation, tended to 
deter  would-be violators.  One study  gleaned 
that  the subjects interviewed would be 
deterred if they  knew  the high  probabilities of 
failure if they  attempted to violate a law, but 
they  had difficulty  estimating  those 
probabilities with  any  rigor.  Other  studies 
more e xpl ic i t ly  focuse d on cr i t i ca l 
infrastructure security,  postulating  that the 
change in  expected utility  or  outcome of a  CI 
attack  would influence the probability  an 
attacker  would want to attack in  the first 
place. Much of the more recent literature 
leverages ideas from  utility  theory  and game 
theory, and thus we leverage the ideas of 
influencing probabilities and consequences, 
along  with game theory  and utility  theory,  in 
our  approach  to quantify  deterrence.  We now 
expound on these theories. 
GAME THEORY AND 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
OPTIONS
Game theory  is an  analytical approach 
designed to help understand interactions 
between  competing  or  cooperating  decision 
makers.  It  treats decision  makers as “players” 
participating  in  a  “game” with  certain  rules 
and assumptions. 34 Two of these assumptions 
are that  decision makers are rational  and that 
they  simultaneously  account for their 
opponents’ anticipated behavior  when 
choosing  a  course of action. Game theory  is 
an  appropriate tool for  studying  the strategic 
interaction between  governments and 
terrorists.35
Game theory  assigns an  expected “payoff” 
value or  expected utility  from  certain  courses 
of action  to each  player.  A  payoff is the 
subjective value of the outcome of a  course of 
action. It  is assumed that  each player  wants 
to maximize his own payoff or  utility.36  But, 
game theory  often predicts an  outcome in 
which  each player  has a  payoff which  may  be 
less than  that  which  they  could gain without 
the influence of their  opponent. Our 
approach will create payoffs or  utility 
functions to be used in a  game, from 
traditional  risk  components: capability, 
vulnerability,  and consequence. Ultimately, 
utility  is a  function  of probabilistic risk.  We 
treat the defender’s probabilistic  loss as the 
attacker’s gain  or  utility  in  the present 
research. We also derive detailed expected 
utility  functions for  an  attacker,  reflecting the 
belief that  terrorists perform  cost-benefit 
analyses.37 
We also examine how  perfection  or 
imperfection  of attacker  information, 
assumptions which we call information 
availability  circumstances,  influences the 
quantifiable effectiveness of deterrence and 
other  components of our  deterrence 
portfolio. In  traditional game theoretical 
approaches, information  imperfection,  or 
lack of information about all opponent 
moves, lends to a pure strategy  Nash 
Equilibrium  (NE) as the predicted outcome 
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of the game,  whereas perfect  information 
generally  lends to a  mixed strategy  NE as the 
predicted game outcome in  a  Stackelburg 
leader-follower game.
However,  we do not  follow  the traditional 
game theoretical  approach  in our  research.  In 
essence,  we eschew  the traditional game 
theoretical  approach of leveraging  a  pure 
Nash  Equilibrium  (NE) or  a  mixed strategy, 
to account  for  the likelihood that adversary 
decision  making  is more complicated that 
what  a  simple equilibrium  predicts.  So,  for 
distinguishing  between  the effects of 
information  availability  upon deterrence 
effectiveness,  we create utility  functions in 
our  deterrence game that  reflect either 
perfect  attacker  information, or  one of what 
we propose are three possible “information 
imperfection  biases”  that the attacker  is 
assumed to have: neutral,  conservative, and 
overconfident.  These biases are part of 
assessing  the adversary  in  a  design-basis 
threat approach.
A  neutral bias means an “average 
attacker”, who will  assume the defender 
deters by  reducing target consequence and 
vulnerability  by  50% of what  they  were prior 
to deterrence investment. A  conservatively 
biased attacker  will  assume the defender 
deters by  reducing target consequence and 
vulnerability  by  95% of what  they  were prior 
to deterrence investments,38  and an 
overconfidently  biased attacker  will assume 
the defender  invests nothing  to deter; thus 
post-deterrence attacker expected utilities are 
the same as pre-deterrence expected utilities. 
We offer  these biases as a  start to exploring 
what  we call a  “theoretical  analysis option” 
for  quantifying  deterrence; more research 
into modeling  attacker  decision  making 
under imperfect information conditions is an 
area  for  future research. There is some 
literature on  this subject,  for  example see 
Jenelius et. al.39 
There are additional  “theoretical analysis 
options” to apply  to our  methodology.  These 
options will allow  us to vary  the composition 
of the utility  functions that we will  use in  our 
methodology  to quantify  deterrence.  Game 
theory  leverages utility  functions and we use 
a  basic game in  our  approach,  and so we 
expound upon  utility  theory  and explain 
different views on  how  people assess 
subjective value in  our  extended literature 
review. In  brief,  subjective expected utility 
claims people make decisions linearly; 
whereas prospect utility  claims people make 
decisions nonlinearly,  subject  to biases. 
There is experimental evidence to support 
nonlinear  decision-making; hence a  well-
informed approach  to quantifying deterrence 
must  consider  these different  ideas as a 
sensitivity  analysis.  Prospect  utility  would 
require us to modify  components of our 
utility  functions with  weights and other 
modifiers to reflect nonlinear  biased 
decision-making. 
The other  theoretical analysis option  is 
probability-investment  relationships.  We 
model utility  function  components such  as 
capability  and vulnerability  probabilities as 
functions of investments,  to capture cost 
information  for return on  investment 
calculations.  That said,  evidence from 
engineering  sciences supports a  nonlinear 
relationship between  effort  applied to solve a 
problem  and the extent  to which  the problem 
is solved. There are linear  and nonlinear 
(exponential)  ways to model how  these 
probabilities change as we invest  more 
money to reduce them. 
Now  that we have examined literature on 
how  deterrence might  be quantified, and 
introduced theories that  are relevant to 
creating the utility  functions in a  game 
theoret ical  approach  to quanti fy ing 
deterrence, we will  explain  our  general 
methodology  to quantify  deterrence in 
context  of a  case  study.  Also,  we will  show 
how  to quantify  defender risk  as result  of the 
deterrence strategies in  the case study,  and 
we will  show  how  to determine deterrence 
investment  efficiency  or  ROI. Before we move 
to our  case study, we summarize the 
applicability  of our  different  theoretical 
analysis options to CI attack deterrence in 
Table 1:
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Applied if we believe the attacker knows 
everything about the defender’s deterrence 
investments
Imperfect Information
Applied if we believe the attacker does not know 
everything about the defender’s deterrence 
investments; the attacker biases their estimates 
based on whether they are overconfident, 




Applied if we believe the attacker analyzes 
probabilities of attack success and probabilities of 
producing consequences, in a linear fashion
Prospect Utility
Applied if we believe the attacker analyzes 
probabilities of attack success and probabilities of 
producing consequences in a nonlinear fashion. 
They bias toward overweighing expected utility 
when in the domain of loss, or behind a reference 
point. 
Thus, an attacker may be more likely to prefer 
attacking a target that objectively is very hard to 
attack or would suffer minimal consequence, if a 






Applied if we believe the attacker’s and 
defender’s investments change attack success and 
consequence mitigation probabilities linearly  (e.g. 
it is possible to attain 100% vulnerability 
elimination)
Exponential
Applied if we believe the attacker’s and 
defender’s investments change attack success and 
consequence mitigation probabilities nonlinearly, 
or more specifically exponentially (e.g. it is 
impossible to attain 100% vulnerability elimination; 
and it becomes progressively harder to reduce the 
same amount of vulnerability with the same dollar 
amount, as we continue to reduce vulnerability)
Table 1: Applicability of Theoretical Analysis Options to CIP
DETERRENCE QUANTIFICATION 
METHODOLOGY - A REAL WORLD 
CASE STUDY
Since we are proposing a methodology  to 
support risk analysis with  deterrence 
measurement,  and risk  analysis is largely  a 
quantitative process,  we develop a  technical 
approach  to quantify  deterrence.  We 
summarize the results of this technical 
approach  here in the context  of a  case study, 
focused on  the potential deterrence 
effectiveness of notional FEMA  Port  Security 
Grant  Program  (PSGP)  infrastructure 
security  grants. 40  In  general,  we must 
compare attacker  expected utilities from  both 
before and after  deterrence investments, 
those investments being  PSGP grants 
improve CIKR security,  in  order to quantify 
deterrence. 
In our  example we create deterrence 
portfolios showing the quantification  of 
TAQUECHEL AND LEWIS, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RISK  11
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 12 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
deterrence given  certain  deterrence COA, 
how  defender  unconditional risk  changes as a 
result  of that  quantifiable deterrence, and 
defender  investment efficiency  or  ROI of 
those deterrence COA.   We also can  show 
how  the results of these portfolios vary  based 
on  information  availability  circumstances: 
either  the attacker  has perfect  information 
and defender  deterrence COA  perform  a 
certain way, or  the attacker  has imperfect 
information  and the defender  deterrence 
effectiveness may  vary  depending  on the 
attacker’s information  imperfection  biases. 
We assume subjective expected utility  and a 
linear  probability-investment  relationship 
throughout our  example in  this paper; future 
work  would analyze deterrence effectiveness 
under different utility  theory  and probability-
investment relationship assumptions.
In  our  example we leverage notional  CI 
risk data  from  an  existing  DHS CI risk 
analysis tool, the US Coast  Guard’s Maritime 
Security  Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM), 
though  any  CI risk  analysis tool  that 
leverages threat, vulnerability, consequence 
data, and mitigation  measures could be used. 
Our  methodology  incorporates MSRAM risk 
data  and extends the interpretation  of that 
data. We will demonstrate how  our 
methodology  can  be applied across multiple 
DHS CI sectors, as our  notional CIKR 
competing for  grant allocations to deter 
attacks are in different CIKR sectors41.
Importantly,  in  our example we assume 
the federal government allocates the 
deterrence funding.  Obviously ,  this 
assumption can  be changed depending  on the 
scenario modeled. We also assume an 
attacker  is not  motivated to attack a  specific 
target  type (e.g.,  an  eco-terrorist  only  wanting 
to attack chemical refineries).  Rather,  the 
attacker  is expected to want to maximize its 
possible utility,  irrespective of target type. 
But, the methodology  could be applied to 
include only  targets of a  specific type in 
future research.
CASE STUDY: QUANTIFYING 
DETERRENCE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
DEFENDER INVESTMENTS, AND 
RESULTING TERRORIST ATTACK RISK 
REDUCTION FOR A CHEMICAL FACILITY 
AND A FERRY TERMINAL 
Suppose we want  to determine the 
quantifiable deterrence effectiveness of 
different CI investments at two different 
targets: a maritime chemical  facility  which  we 
denote target  A, and a  ferry  terminal which 
we denote target  B.  The “defender”  is the 
government  and target  owner/operators 
working  in  collaboration, and the design-
basis threat  for  the “attacker”  is a  non-
specific terrorist  organization  that  attacks 
these targets in  one specific  way  (e.g.,  boat 
bomb).  Our two notional targets are in 
different DHS CI sectors;  yet they  often  exist 
together  in  a local  operational environment 
such  as a  port. We note that  we only  use two 
targets for  simplicity  in  illustrating the 
methodology; however  our  methodology  can 
be applied to as many  targets as desired. The 
deterrence game can  be expanded as 
necessary; computer  programming  may  be 
required to capture CIKR in a large game.42
The defender  has already  invested to 
reduce vulnerability  and consequence at 
these targets,  and thus we can  estimate how 
we have reduced risk in  the traditional sense. 
However,  given  DHS encouragement to 
examine deterrence, and given  that  agencies 
currently  report  risk reduction  performance 
effectiveness metrics to Congress and thus 
conceivably  may  be required to report 
deterrence effectiveness and resulting  risk 
reduction in  the future, we now  want  to 
analyze the potential  deterrent effects of 
hypothetical future deterrence investments, 
in a quantifiable way.
There are eleven basic steps to quantifying 
deterrence and creating our  deterrence 
portfolio to address all three deterrence 
strategy  questions introduced at  the 
beginning  of this paper. In  sum, there are 
three phases of analysis: pre-deterrence 
analysis, post-deterrence analysis, and 
comparison  to quantify  deterrence and create 
the deterrence portfolio. This portfolio would 
add data  to the existing  library  of CIKR 
security  plans and supporting  decision-
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making.  We discuss these three analysis 
phases in context of our case study. 
PRE-DETERRENCE ANALYSIS FINDINGS
Pre-Deterrence Attacker  Expected 
Utilities
The notional expected utility  values in  Table 
2  include capability  to attack, vulnerability  to 
attack  as a  function  of security  investments, 
and consequence mitigated by  recovery/
response measures. For  example,  suppose the 
intelligence community  estimates a  terrorist 
organization’s capability  to initiate an  attack 
with  a  boat  bomb against either  type of 
facility.  Also, prior  to implementation  of 
PSGP grants intended to deter, suppose both 
the chemical  facility  and ferry  terminal have 
measures to detect an  attack  in  progress (e.g., 
cameras); training and equipment  to engage 
an  attack  before it  reaches the focal point  of 
the infrastructure for  detonation  (such  as 
armed guards stationed within  a reasonable 
response time from  where an  attack would 
initiate); and has the means to defeat that 
attack  (guards have proper  weapons and 
training).  Finally, suppose each  facility  has 
business continuity  plans and coordinates 
with  stakeholders to ensure recoverability  if 
attacked.  These are all pre-deterrence 
mitigation capabilities.  These data  are 
assumed to represent (1)  the attacker’s 
perceptions of their  attack capabilities and 
(2)  target vulnerability  and consequence 
based on attacker  “scoping”  reflecting 
extensive research  and observations of the 
above-listed target attributes.
Attacker ith attack option
Notional expected utility value ($)
Attack chemical facility
 $257,142.86
Attack ferry terminal $763,636.36
Attack both $1,020,779.22
Refrain from attack $0
Table 2: Notional attacker pre-deterrence expected utilities
Table 2  shows that  given  our notional pre-
deterrence vulnerability, and consequence 
data  for  the chemical  facility  and ferry 
terminal,  and attacker  capabilities to attack 
each respectively,  attacking  both  targets 
simultaneously  yields the greatest  expected 
utility  to the attacker. This is intuitive,  but we 
quantify  that  intuition  here in  dollars, and in 
comparison  to the utility  of other  attack 
options. 
Pre-Deterrence Attacker Intent Values
Given  the above expected utilities,  we can 
create intent values:
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Attacker ith attack option
Notional intent value (%)
 
Attack chemical facility 12.60%
Attack ferry terminal 37.40%
Attack both 50.00%
Refrain from attack 0.00%
Table 3: Notional attacker pre-deterrence intent values
Table 3  shows that attacker  intent  to 
attack  both  targets simultaneously  is greatest. 
Since Table 2  showed the greatest  expected 
utility  to results from  this attacker  option, it 
is no surprise  that  this option  results in  the 
greatest attacker intent value.
Pre-Deterrence Defender 
Unconditional Risk
We then apply  these intent values in Table 3 
t o c o n d i t i o n a l r i s k v a l u e s , t o g e t 
unconditional risk values:
Attacker ith attack option
Notional unconditional risk value ($)
Attack chemical facility $32,388.22  
Attack ferry terminal $285,634.98 
Attack both  $510,389.61
Refrain from attack $0.00
Table 4: Notional defender pre-deterrence unconditional risk values
Not surprisingly, Table 4  shows that  the 
unconditional  risk of having  both  targets 
attacked simultaneously  is greatest. So, going 
forward we can  expect  that  the attacker’s 
greatest expected utility  before we deter 
would result  from  attacking  both targets 
simultaneously; thus their  intent is greatest. 
And, our unconditional  expected loss, or risk, 
f r o m  h a v i n g  b o t h t a r g e t s a t t a c k e d 
simultaneously, is our greatest risk.
POST-DETERRENCE ANALYSIS 
FINDINGS
Post-Deterrence Attacker Expected 
Utilities 
We note that  there are sixteen  attacker 
expected utilities post-deterrence, as opposed 
to four  pre-deterrence, because the defender 
has four different deterrence investment 
options. These options are (1) to invest  PSGP 
TAQUECHEL AND LEWIS, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RISK  14
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 12 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
grant money  at  only  the chemical facility  (for 
instance to increase the CCTV capabilities to 
detect); (2)  invest grant  money  at only  the 
ferry  terminal (for instance to provide more 
training and equipment for  terminal security 
personnel); (3) award grants to both; or  (4) 
award grants to neither.43  The attacker  post-
deterrence expected utilities are as a  function 






















            
Notional expected 





$57,142.88 $257,142.86 $57,142.86 $257,142.86
Attack ferry
terminal 
$763,636.36 $190,000.00 $190,000.00 $763,636.36
Attack both $820,779.22 $447,142.86 $247,142.86 $1,020,779.22
Refrain from 
attack
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Table 5: Notional  attacker post-deterrence expected utilities, defender deters by investing in four different 
ways
Table 5  shows that  given  our  notional 
p o s t - d e t e r r e n c e v u l n e r a b i l i t y ,  a n d 
consequence data for  the chemical  facility 
and ferry  terminal, and attacker  post-
deterrence capabilities to attack  each 
respect ively ,  at tacking  both  targets 
simultaneously  yields the greatest  expected 
utility  to the attacker, for  each  of the four 
defender  deterrence COA. This notional data 
may  reflect defender efforts to reduce 
capability  (prevent),  reduce vulnerability 
(protect),  and reduce consequence (response 
and recover),  though  in  this example the 
specific PSGP grants are intended to reduce 
vulnerability.  Overall the attacker would gain 
the greatest  expected utility  if they  attacked 
both  and the defender  invested nothing in 
deterrence,  as seen  in  Table 5. This seems 
intuitive, but here we quantify this intuition. 
Post-Deterrence Intent Values
Given  the expected utilities described above, 
we can create sixteen intent values. 
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3.48% 28.75% 11.56% 13.62%
Attack ferry 
terminal 
46.52% 21.25% 38.44%  37.55%
Attack both 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Refrain from 
attack 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 6: Notional  attacker post-deterrence intent values, defender deters by investing in four different 
ways
Table 6  shows that attacker  intent  to attack both  targets simultaneously  always dominates,  as 
would be expected since attacker expected utility is always greatest.
Post-Deterrence Defender Unconditional Risk 






risk value ($), 
defender invests 
at chem. facility






   
Notional 
unconditional 
risk value ($), 
defender invests 
at both
             
Notional 
unconditional 






$1,989.15 $73,938.84 $6,606.11 $32,388.22
Attack ferry
terminal 
$355,235.90 $40,367.41 $73,034.68 $285,634.98
Attack both $410,389.61       $223,571.43 $123,571.43 $510,389.61
Refrain from 
attack 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Table 7: Notional  defender post-deterrence unconditional risk values, defender deters by investing in four 
different ways
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Table 7  shows that regardless of what  the defender  does to deter, the greatest risk is of having 
both  targets simultaneously  attacked; but  intuitively  – by  investing  at  both targets – this risk  is 
minimized. These unconditional  risk scores reflect  the vulnerability  reduction  effects of the 
notional grant investments,  but  also reflect the deterrence effects (changing attacker intent)  of 
the investments.  Now, we compare this pre-deterrence and post-deterrence data  to develop our 
deterrence portfolio.
COMPARING PRE-DETERRENCE AND POST-DETERRENCE DATA
Quantification of Deterrence
We compare intent  values from  Tables 3  and 6, using Equation  1  to quantify  the deterrence 
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Effectiveness (%), 














N/A N/A N/A 0.00%
Table 8: Notional quantification of deterrence effectiveness of four different defender deterrence COA
Notice that  investing at  target A  reduced 
attacker  intent to attack target  A  nearly  72%, 
whereas the negative sign  for attacking  B 
means the attacker  is actually  incentivized to 
attack  target  B.  Thus,  this deterrence COA  is 
quantified as 72% effective at  deterring  an 
attack  against  target A,  whereas it  is 24% 
ineffective at deterring  an  attack against 
target  B.  It is intuitive that we would transfer 
intent to B by  deterring  attacks on A,  and we 
can  quantify  this intuition  here.  Now, we 
want to know  the deterrence effectiveness of 
investing at target B.
As expected,  investing  at target B 
incentivizes the attacker to attack target  A,  by 
increasing  intent 128%, whereas it  reduces 
intent to attack  B and thus deters by  43%. 
Thus, this transfers intent to attack target A. 
Given  that  we have to make a  decision  on 
where to invest  to deter,  would we rather 
invest at  A  or  B? To support this decision,  we 
must  know  how  defender  unconditional  risk 
changes given each  possible deterrence COA. 
Transfer  of intent  and quantifiable deterrence 
effectiveness are useful metrics but are also 
means to an  end: determining  the resulting 
change in unconditional risk. 
Finally,  we examine the deterrence 
effectiveness of investing  at both targets. The 
attacker  is marginally  incentivized to attack 
target B,  perhaps because of the large 
consequence as compared to that  of target  A, 
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and the attacker  is slightly  deterred from 
attacking target  A  in  response.  As with  the 
previous two deterrence investment  options, 
we must  determine the resulting  defender 
conditional risk across all attacker  options, if 
the defender  deters by  investing  at  both 
targets.  We note that  the deterrence 
effectiveness of refraining  from  investment is 
0% for all  attacker  options; attacker  post-
deterrence intent does not  change from  pre-
deterrence intent  if the defender  does 
nothing.
New Defender Unconditional Risk
Given  this deterrence quantification  data, we 
now  analyze the second component of a 
deterrence portfolio,  or  how  defender 
unconditional  risk  changes as a  result  of 
quantifiable deterrence. We leverage Table 7 
data  and aggregate defender  unconditional 
risk given an lth deterrence COA. 
Deterrence COA 




Invest at ferry 
terminal
$337,877.67
Invest at both $203,212.22
Invest at neither $828,412.81
Table 9: Comparing aggregate defender unconditional risk given certain defender deterrence investments
Overall,  the best quantifiably  effective 
defender  deterrence COA is to deter  by 
investing  at  both  the chemical facility  and the 
ferry  terminal,  as the resulting unconditional 
risk is lowest.  The least  quantifiably  effective 
deterrence COA  is to do nothing, as the risk  is 
highest. From  a  deterrence effectiveness and 
unconditional risk reduction perspective, 
these seem  intuitive decisions,  but  with our 
methodology  we can  quantify  the deterrent 
effect  of these COA  and quantify  the impacts 
on  risk  reduction,  relative  to the impacts of 
other COA.  Thus we see relative strengths 
and weakness of each  option,  and a  decision 
maker can  improve their  risk reduction  and 
deterrence performance measurement 
reporting  beyond just reporting  “we’ve 
invested to deter  and reduce risk.”  Also, this 
t e c h n i q u e o f a g g r e g a t e d e f e n d e r 
unconditional  risk across all attacker  options 
assuages the concern  with  transferring intent 
or  risk from  one target  to another;44  if we 
simply  compare all  possible outcomes before 
deterrence and after deterrence,  we now  have 
a  metric that  acknowledges possible transfer 
of intent  between  targets,  but looks at  the big 
picture. We believe a “transfer  of intent” does 
not necessarily  equate to a  transfer  of risk. 
We must  consider  the capability  to execute an 
attack,  vulnerabi l i ty  to attack,  and 
consequence of an  attack on all  targets in  the 
game. If the resulting  intent  to attack  target 
B, when  combined with  these other  risk 
f a c t o r s ,  r e n d e r s a n  o v e r a l l l o w e r 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l r i s k t o B t h a n  t h e 
unconditional  risk of an attack on  target A,  in 
fact we have not transferred risk.
Return on Investment
Suppose the grant to defend the chemical 
facility  with  additional CCTV  is for  $1 
million; the grant to defend the ferry  terminal 
by  training and equipping  security  personnel 
costs $2  million, and $3  million is the cost  to 
defend both  simultaneously.  We show  the 
ROI of each deterrence COA:
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Deterrence COA
ROI (unitless)
Invest at target A 2.66*10^-7
Invest at target B 3.01*10^-7
Invest at both 3.12*10^-7
Invest at neither N/A
Table 10: ROI of certain defender deterrence investments (ROI unit-less since risk reduction in $)
Notice that  there is no ROI of refraining 
from  investment,  as we cannot divide by  $0. 
Since we invested the same total dollar 
amount  for  each  lth  deterrence COA  in  this 
example,  we get  the best  ROI from  investing 
in  both  targets, as that created the lowest 
aggregate  defender  unconditional risk  as seen 
in  Table 9.  This is an additional  performance 
measurement  for  a  decision  maker  to report. 
However,  if we were to use different  dollar 
values for  the different  lth  COA,  the ROI 
rankings might be different.
Using  Tables 2  through  10,  we can  now 
create deterrence portfolios for  each  lth 
deterrence COA. For  example the deterrence 
portfolio for  lth  COA=investing at target  A, 
with  respect all  possible kth  attacker  post-
deterrence options, is:
Figure 1: Values for deterrence portfolio, 
defender deters by investing at chemical facility 
alone (target A), perfect information
In  Figure 1,  represents average 
unconditional  risk resulting  from  deterring at 
target  A.  We can  repeat  this consolidation  of 
Tables 2  through  10  for the remaining three 
deterrence COA, which  will  show  that 
investing  at  both  targets is the best  option  for 
reducing risk and ROI. These deterrence 
portfolios are a  succinct way  for  government 
agencies and CI owners/operators to report 
the deterrence effectiveness of deterrence 
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measures, and resulting  CI risk  reduction  and 
ROI. Decision makers may  value different 
components of these portfolios differently; if 
both  the government and CI operators will 
invest to deter, then they  must  decide what 
the most  important component of the 
deterrence portfolios are. If industry  is the 
only  contributor of deterrence funding, then 
perhaps ROI may  be the most important 
component. If government is the only 
contributor,  the public  may  expect  risk  to be 
reduced as much  as possible,  regardless of 
ROI. Our  methodology  simply  supports the 
need to analyze the data; decision  makers 
must then make the decisions.
COMPARING CASE STUDY 
RESULTS TO THOSE OF A CASE 
STUDY WITH IMPERFECT 
INFORMATION ASSUMPTIONS
Since we assumed perfect information  for  the 
results of our  case study,  we want  now  to 
show  how  these deterrence portfolios change 
f o r  d i f f e r e n t  a t t a c k e r  i n f o r m a t i o n 
imperfection  biases. We show  this analysis, 
using  the same notional data  as before but 
including  each  of the three attacker 
information  imperfection  biases: neutral, 
overconfident, and conservative. These biases 
are part  of the scenario development, often 
referred to as “design-basis threat.”  This 
analysis is available from  the authors, and 
has practical implications for  decision 
makers. We summarize our limited analyses:
1. We get  counterintuitive results for  when a 
neutral attacker is assumed; we can 
actually  show  that  when  we have little to 
invest at  the chemical facility  (target A) it 
actually  makes sense to make that 
information  known  to the attacker, 
because the average unconditional risk to 
the defender  is less if the  deterrence 
i n v e s t m e n t i s k n o w n  g i v e n  t h i s 
deterrence COA. In  contrast,  if we have a 
lot  to invest  at the chemical  facility,  we 
can  show  that  it  makes sense to withhold 
that  information. These findings are due 
to the disparity  in  the notional maximum 
economic  consequence values of the 
chemical facility  and the ferry  terminal, 
and may  not  hold if we change the 
n o t i o n a l t a r g e t  d a t a . T h u s ,  i n 
circumstances similar  to those of our 
notional example,  a decision  maker  may 
prefer  to make a counterintuitive decision 
and ensure perfect information  if they 
deter  by  investing  at the chemical facility, 
even if they do not invest much. 
2. For  when we assume an  overconfident 
attacker, it  makes sense for  the defender 
to withhold information  i f their 
deterrence COA  is to invest  at  a  target 
with  lower  maximum  economic value. 
This seems counterintuitive as in  general 
if we have an  overconfident attacker, 
making  our  deterrence information 
known to the attacker  might reduce their 
confidence,  but  we show  that this is not 
necessarily  true. Thus, a  decision  maker 
in  circumstances similar  to those of our 
notional examples may  prefer  to invest  at 
the chemical facility  but ensure that the 
details of that  investment are withheld 
from an overconfident attacker.
3. F i n a l l y , f o r  w h e n  w e a s s u m e a 
conservative attacker,  it makes sense for 
the defender  to communicate deterrence 
information  if their  deterrence COA is to 
invest at  a target  with  a  lower  maximum 
economic value. This also seems 
counterintuitive as in  general if we have a 
conservative attacker  they  might be 
emboldened by  information  about  what 
the defender  is doing  to deter,  but  we 
show  this is not  necessarily  true.  Thus,  a 
decision  maker  in circumstances similar 
to those of our  notional examples may 
prefer  to invest  at  the chemical facility, 
and should ensure the details of that 
investment  are communicated to a 
conservative attacker.
DETERRENCE METHODOLOGY 
AND APPLICATION: SUMMARY 
We have shown  how  to quantify  deterrence 
effectiveness of different  defender  courses of 
action, based on  the changes in  attacker 
intent values after  the defender  deters,  as 
compared to the attacker  intent  values before 
the defender  deters.  These intent  values are 
functions of attacker  pre-deterrence and 
post-deterrence expected utilities,  and those 
utilities are functions of attacker  capability  to 
TAQUECHEL AND LEWIS, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RISK  20
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 12 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
attack, CI target vulnerability, and CI 
consequence if attacked. Together,  capability, 
vulnerability,  and consequence make up 
defender  conditional risk, or  the risk given  an 
attack is already desired (intent=100%). 
We have also shown  how  to quantify  the 
average defender  unconditional risk, or 
conditional risk multiplied by  the attacker 
intent  probability,  both  before and after 
measurable deterrence.  Finally,  we have 
shown how  to calculate return on  investment 
of the  deterrence COA, and we have shown 
how  to incorporate these data  into a 
deterrence portfolio which CI officials and 
government  agencies can use to report  both 
quantifiable deterrence and resulting  CI risk 
reduction/ROI. This approach  allows a 
practitioner  to implement  DHS policy,  which 
advocates both  deterrence and risk  reduction, 
in  an  integrated fashion. Our  methodology  is 
general  enough  to be applied to CI in  multiple 
sectors,  as our  example demonstrated, and 
the genera l concepts o f capabi l i ty , 
vulnerability,  and consequence can be 
a p p l i e d t o a n y  t y p e o f i n t e n t i o n a l 
act. 
Our  example of how  our methodology 
would be applied produced deterrence 
portfolios of four  different  deterrence COA. 
Overall, we found that  investing in  both 
targets in  a  two-target  game yielded the best 
quantifiable deterrence effectiveness, the 
lowest unconditional  risk  to the defender, 
and the best ROI.  Our brief analysis of a 
deterrence portfolio under  imperfect 
information  circumstances revealed some 
counterintuitive results with  implications for 
decision makers. 
DIRECTION FOR FUTURE WORK
Our  methodology  and findings are based on 
many  assumptions. Future work on 
quantifying  CI deterrence must  consider 
these assumptions and vary  them  in order  to 
discover  new  insights into this challenge.  We 
offer the following specific suggestions.
CIKR SECTOR SPECIFICS
While  we believe our  proposed methodology 
is general  enough  to be applied to all  DHS 
sectors, future work should examine ways to 
tailor this broad methodology  to reflect 
nuances of CIKR in different CIKR sectors.
OWNER/OPERATOR ROLE
Future work  may  be necessary  to modify  this 
methodology  for  scenarios where owners/
operators implement security  measures 
intended to deter, but  bear  the costs 
themselves. 
INITIAL TARGET AND ACTOR DATA 
ASSUMPTIONS
We have assumed specific  CI target 
characteristics,  defender  pre-deterrence 
investments in  vulnerability  and consequence 
reduction,  attacker  investment  in  capability 
enhancement,  and other  factors.  Future work 
should modify  this data  before drawing 
conclusions from  this methodology  to 
quantify  deterrence.  Also, future work could 
change the complexity  of various risk 
equation  components as desired; for 
example,  the consequence equations could be 
expanded to include factors such  as loss of 
public trust.
UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS
There is inherent  uncertainty  and subjectivity 
in probabilistic risk analysis. Since our 
methodology  uses probabilistic capability, 
vulnerability,  and consequence mitigation 
estimates, future work must  address the 
uncertainty  associated with  these estimates 
and determine the implicat ions for 
quantifiable deterrence effectiveness and 
resulting risk  reduction. Tools such  as 
MSRAM,  which  inform  and are improved by 
our  deterrence quantification  methodology, 
have built-in  subjectivity  reduction  measures 
that could be leveraged.
GAME THEORY APPROACH 
ASSUMPTIONS
We have used an  unusual  approach  to a  game 
theoretical  analysis by  discarding  the notion 
of using either  a  pure or  mixed strategy  Nash 
Equilibrium. We also have taken  the unusual 
approach of using attacker  information 
imperfect ion  biases as a  proxy  for 
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information  when  perfect  information  about 
defender  investments is not available. Our 
approach  is suited for  our  assumptions that 
neither  pure nor mixed equilibrium  strategies 
are appropriate for  our  present  focus on 
quantifying the deterrence effects of defender 
investments.  Nonetheless, future work 
should leverage more traditional game 
t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h e s t o q u a n t i f y 
deterrence.  In  support  of such  future work, 
we have already  hypothesized how  defender 
expected utility  functions should be 
formulated for  a more traditional game 
theoretical  approach.  The defender  expected 
utility  at  equilibrium  would be converted to 
loss,  and then  combined with  attacker  intent 
to attack  (presumably  with  a  pure NE that 
intent is 100%) to show  the new  defender 
unconditional risk. 
Also, we assumed a two-target game; 
future work  should examine how  deterrence 
can  be quantified in  a  game with  more than 
two CI targets. This may  require computer 
programs.  Also,  there are many  repositories 
of CIKR data  and risk  information,  such  as 
MSRAM,  ACAMS,  and other databases to 
assist with this endeavor.
ADVERSARY TARGET PREFERENCES
Our  example assumes the attacker  has no 
preference for a  certain target  type; they 
simply  want to maximize their  overall 
expected utility  from  attacks.  Future research 
can  apply  this methodology  for  issue-specific 
groups such  as eco-terrorists who only  want 
to target specific  target  types. This can 
support  decision  making  on  where to allocate 
defensive resources amongst  similar  target 
types in a defined geographic area. 
OTHER RISK METHODOLOGIES
Our  example has leveraged notional data 
from  one risk analysis tool,  the Coast  Guard’s 
MSRAM.  Future work  may  use risk  data  from 
different tools and techniques to get  the CIKR 
vulnerability  and consequence data, and 
attacker  capability  data  our  approaches 
requires.
NETWORK ANALYSIS AND CIKR 
INTERDEPENDENCIES
Future work will examine how  to quantify  the 
deterrence effects of investments to secure 
networks of infrastructure from  attack, 
including cyber  networks.  Network analysis 
uses different  mathematical  techniques to 
calculate network risk,  but  our  methodology 
could still be applied. Future research  could 
also consider  the deterrent effects of 
investments in  CIKR when those CIKR are 
co-located in  or  close proximity  to other 
CIKR.
UTILITY FUNCTION COMPOSITION 
ASSUMPTIONS
We assumed attacker  utilities and defender 
expected losses (risk)  did not  subtract their 
respective expenditures from  the CI target 
values; the utility  functions were only 
capability,  vulnerability,  and consequence 
modeled as functions of those expenditures. 
However,  one could easily  claim  that  attacker 
utility  and defender  risk must  account  for  the 
respective lost  expenditures, and subtract 
them  from  the expected benefit  or  add them 
onto the defender loss if an  attack on  a CI 
succeeds.  Future work  could create utility 
functions that  subtract expenditures from 
target  value. Also, we assumed the attacker’s 
expected utility  as a  function  of capability, 
vulnerability,  and consequence, was the same 
as the defender’s expected loss,  thus creating 
a  “symmetry”  between attacker  and defender 
functions.  Introducing  costs and budgets to 
the utility  functions for  each  actor  could 
create an asymmetrical game.
INFORMATION AVAILABILITY 
CIRCUMSTANCE ASSUMPTIONS
We have assumed that  CI information  was 
known to the attacker  prior  to defender 
deterrence efforts; future analysis could 
assume that  the defender wants to quantify 
the deterrent effect  of additional defensive 
investments even  when  their  original  CI 
investments and resulting  security  were not 
clear  to the attacker. We have also assumed 
that  attacker  information  is perfectly  known 
TAQUECHEL AND LEWIS, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RISK  22
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 12 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
to the defender; in  reality  this is likely  not 
true and should be examined.
In situations where perfect  information  is 
determined to be more advantageous,  the CI 
operator  must  work actively  with  law 
enforcement  and other  government entities 
to aggressively  communicate security  and 
consequence mitigation  deterrence measure 
information, in  great  detail to potential 
attackers.  Obviously, this wil l  be a 
challenging and imperfect  endeavor,  but  the 
effort  is still  warranted if the methodology 
shows it  is to our  advantage to make 
information  known to prospective attackers. 
The intelligence community  could contribute 
to this effort  as they  glean  information  on 
what  the adversary  knows and believes about 
our  deterrence efforts,  but  much  work must 
be done by  CI operators and law  enforcement 
authorities,  as well as public figures that 
communicate effectively  and reach  a  broad 
audience.
However,  if the effort required to develop 
and execute a  public affairs deterrence 
campaign  exceeds the expected loss to the 
government  if deterrence fails,  perhaps the 
campaign  is not  worthwhile,  and the 
quantitative result  supporting  a  perfect 
information advantage may be discarded.
In  situations where imperfect  information 
is determined to be more advantageous, the 
CI operator  and law  enforcement, as well  as 
public figures, must collaborate to ensure 
security  measures are not  obvious to any 
observer.  This could entail  conduct  “red cell” 
exercises where someone simulates a 
terrorist  planning cell and visit  a  CI to see 
what  security  they  can  identify,  and/or 
researches open  source documentation  on 
the security  and economic  value of CI.  Also, 
the government  may  even have to classify 
security  measures, such  as federal  grant 
funding.
UTILITY THEORY ASSUMPTIONS
We assumed subjective expected utility  in  our 
case study.  In our  initial work to expand this 
methodology  leveraging  prospect  utility 
theory, we have used a  linear scale for  the PU 
utility  and probability  modifiers, but  the 
work  of Daniel Kahneman  and Amos Tversky 
suggests a nonlinear  scale. 45  Future work 
should leverage a  nonlinear scale, and can 
exercise that  scale by  assuming  different 
deterrence investment  amounts in  the 
deterrence game and determining  which 
modifier applies.  Kahneman  and Tversky 
have done other work on decision analysis 
that  could be applied to the utility  functions. 
Also,  Lisa  Carlson  and Raymond Dacey 
suggest that  the PU probability  weighting 
functions may  determine the difference 
between  behavior  of attackers under  SEU 
assumptions and under  PU assumptions;46 
thus the extent to which deterrence might  be 
more quantifiably  effective under one 
assumption as compared to the other  could 
be analyzed by  explicitly  observing  the effects 
of different probability weights.
PROBABILITY-INVESTMENT 
RELATIONSHIP ASSUMPTIONS
Future work should also change the slope of 
the exponential  probability-investment 
relationship curves that  support  capability, 
vulnerability, and economic consequence 
estimates. We assumed elimination  fractions 
of 5% vulnerability  and 5% capability  to 
attack  in  our  initial work  to create deterrence 
portfolios leveraging  exponential probability-
investment  relationship assumptions; these 
fractions could be modified to yield different 
curves and possibly  yield different  deterrence 
portfolio results.  Also, we have assumed a 
linear  relationship between  target  economic 
value retention  and defender  consequence 
mitigation  investment  in  this paper’s 
example.  In  reality,  this relationship may  be 
nonlinear. We only  assumed that  CI target 
vulnerability  and attacker  capability 
probability-investment relationships could be 
nonlinear  on  theoretical  grounds; future 
work  should analyze relationships between 
probability  reduction  and investments to 
develop rough  cost  curves.  Finally, we have 
assumed attacker capability  is reduced by 
defender  offensive counterterrorism 
investment, but the attacker  does not 
counteract  this effect  by  increasing their 
investments. Future work should model the 
simultaneous effects of attacker  and defender 
investment upon attacker capability.
TAQUECHEL AND LEWIS, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RISK  23
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 12 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Eric F. Taquechel is a lieutenant commander 
in the  United States Coast Guard and currently 
serves as chief of Contingency Planning and 
Force  Readiness, Sector Boston. He  has ten years 
of active  duty commissioned Coast Guard service 
and previously served in USCGC GALLATIN, 
Marine  Safety Office  and Sector Houston-
Galveston, and the Domestic Port Security 
Evaluation Division at USCG Headquarters. He 
most recently authored “Layered Defense: 
Modeling Terrorist Transfer Threat Networks 
and Optimizing Network Risk Reduction,”  in 
IEEE Network Magazine. LCDR Taquechel 
earned a master’s degree  in security studies from 
the  Naval Postgraduate  School and prior to that 
earned his  undergraduate  degree  at the  US  Coast 
Guard Academy. LCDR Taquechel may be 
contacted at eric.taquechel@uscg.mil.
Ted G. Lewis  is  a professor of computer science 
and executive director of the  Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security at the Naval 
Postgraduate  School. He  has forty years 
experience  in academic, industrial, and advisory 
capacities, ranging from academic appointments 
at the  University of Missouri-Rolla, University of 
Louisiana, and Oregon State  University, to 
senior vice  president of Eastman Kodak 
C o m p a n y , t o C E O a n d p r e s i d e n t o f 
DaimlerChrysler Research and Technology, 
North America. Dr. Lewis  has published over 
thirty books and 100 research papers. He  is the 
author of Critical  Infrastructure Protection  in 
Homeland Security: Defending  a Networked 
Nation  (2006) and, most recently, Network 
Science: Theory  and Applications (2009). He 
received his PhD in computer science  from 
Washington State  University. Dr. Lewis may be 
contacted at tlewis@nps.edu.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the 
contributions of Dr. Richard Adler.
The views expressed herein are those of the 
authors  and do not reflect  the views of  the United 
States  Coast Guard or  the Department of 
Homeland Security.
TAQUECHEL AND LEWIS, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RISK  24
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 12 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
TAQUECHEL AND LEWIS, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RISK  25
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 12 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (2009), http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf 
2 http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1214597989952.shtm#1
3 Andrew R. Morral and Brian A. Jackson, “Understanding the Role of Deterrence in Counterterrorism Security,” 
RAND Occasional Paper (2009), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP281.pdf 
4 See http://teamcore.usc.edu/projects/coastguard/ 
5 Information about this initiative is available from the authors.
6 http://birenheide.com/sra/2011AM/program/singlesession.php3?sessid=M4-H. 
7 In our example, we will show that deterrence measurement by itself may not be conclusive; it must be incorporated 
into a risk equation to have value and show changes in risk. 
8 DHS agencies currently are reporting risk reduction effectiveness of various CIKR security initiatives. For 
example, the Coast Guard reports port, waterways, and coastal security (PWCS) risk reduction efforts to Congress 
annually. Further, if DHS funds security investments for CIKR o/o, then they will necessarily be “joined at the hip” 
with those o/o to monitor implementation. Thus, DHS would be able to explain how the CIKR o/o’s are deterring 
and thus reducing risk. For scenarios where DHS does not provide funding, there is no guarantee they could 
effectively report to Congress because they would not be coordinating with their CIKR stakeholders.
9 Deterrence is the study of influencing an intelligent actor’s decision making; this does not apply to unintentional 
threats where there is no human element or deliberative process.
10 http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1215444247124.shtm. 
11 Morral and Jackson, “Understanding the Role of Deterrence.”
12 Some DHS risk analysis tools, such as the US Coast Guard’s Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM), 
have the ability to monetize human lives using a technique known as Value of Statistical Life (VSL), and draw 
equivalencies between different types of consequence using what is referred to as a Consequence Equivalency 
Matrix.
13 The Coast Guard’s MSRAM model uses a strategic threat value, without considering specific target attributes.
14 Opportunistic attackers still face the challenge of overcoming security. If deterrence is influencing the decision 
making of an adversary, an opportunistic attacker could still be deterred by what they observe as they commence 
their attack, but that amounts to more of a tactical deterrence or last minute change in the attack planning cycle. 
With respect to those same security measures, more deliberate attackers would be deterred but earlier in their 
planning cycle, and have more time to adapt.
15 Louis A. Cox, “Some Limitations of ‘Risk=Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence’ for Risk Analysis of Terrorist 
Attacks,” Risk Analysis 28 (2008): 1749-1761. 
16 Recoverability and resiliency measures may be too expensive for certain CIKR owners/operators to implement, 
but the risk equation still includes a placeholder for a consequence mitigation factor. In application, this mitigation 
factor may be 0, meaning expected consequence =100% of maximum potential consequence. Also, federal grants 
could help offset the costs of resilience measures.
17 For a detailed explanation of MSRAM, see Brady C. Downs, “The Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model,” CG 
Proceedings 64 (2007): 36-38.
18 DHS, National Infrastructure Protection Plan.
TAQUECHEL AND LEWIS, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RISK  26
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 12 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
19 Nikhil S. Dighe, Jun Zhuang, and Vicki M. Bier, “Secrecy in Defensive Allocations as a Strategy for Achieving 
more Cost Effective Deterrence,” International Journal of Performability Engineering 5 (2009): 31- 43.
20 Ibid.
21Morral and Jackson, “Understanding the Role of Deterrence.”
22 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, DHS Risk Lexicon (2010), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-risk-
lexicon-2010.pdf.    
23 See, for example: Stanley Kaplan and John B. Garrick, “On the Quantitative Definition of Risk,” Risk Analysis 1 
(1981): 11-27; Tim Bedford and Roger Cooke, Probabilistic Risk Analysis: Foundations and Methods (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Elisabeth Paté-Cornell and Seth Guikema, “Probabilistic Modeling of 
Terrorist Threats: A Systems Analysis Approach to Setting Priorities Among Countermeasures,” Military Operations 
Research 7 (2002): 5-20.
24 For examples of probabilistic risk tools being used in DHS, see Table 2-1 on pages 25-26 of the National 
Academy of Sciences Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s Approach to Risk Analysis”, 2010, 
available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12972&page=R1.  
25 Richard N. Lebow and Janet G. Stein, “Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter,” World Politics 
41 (1989): 208–224.
26 Elaine M. Bunn, “Can Deterrence Be Tailored?” Strategic Forum, No. 225 (Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, January 2007),  http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=481759. 
27 William M. McGill and Bilal M. Ayyub, “The Meaning of Vulnerability in the Context of Critical Infrastructure 
Protection,” in Critical Infrastructure Protection: Elements of Risk (GMU School of Law Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Program, December 2007): 25-48, http://www.steelcityre.com/documents/RiskMonograph_1207.pdf. 
28 Patrick M. Cronin and Audrey K. Cronin, “Challenging Deterrence: Strategic Stability in the Twenty-first 
Century,” Special Joint Report of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the University of Oxford 
Character of War Programme (2007), http://ccw.modhist.ox.ac.uk/events/archives/mt06_deterrence/
deterrence_report_mt2006.pdf. 
29 Richard N. Lebow, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Reading the Lessons Correctly,” Political Science Quarterly 98 
(1983): 431–458.
30 U.S. Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, version 2.0 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2006), www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/do_joc_v20.doc. 
31 John A. Major, “Advanced Techniques for Modeling Terrorism Risk,” Journal of Risk Finance 4 (2002): 15-24.
32 Bunn, “Can Deterrence by Tailored?”.
33 Erik Jenelius, Jonas Westin, and Åke J. Holmgren, “Critical Infrastructure Protection Under Imperfect Attacker 
Perception,” International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection 3 (2010): 16-26.
34 Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubenstein,  A Course in Game Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994).
35 Todd Sandler and Daniel G. Arce, “Terrorism & Game Theory,” Simulating and Gaming 34 (2003): 319–337.
36 Roger B. Myerson, Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: a Game Theorist’s Perspective (Strategic Studies 
Institute, US Army War College, 2007). http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=823. 
37 Morral and Jackson, “Understanding the Role of Deterrence.”
TAQUECHEL AND LEWIS, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RISK  27
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 12 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
38 We use 95% elimination instead of 100% elimination to accommodate the theory that probability-investment 
relationships are exponential and thus probability of loss cannot be 100% eliminated, although in our case study 
examples our utility functions assume a linear relationship.
39 Jenelius et. al., “Critical Infrastructure Protection Under Imperfect Attacker Perception.”
40 See http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/2011/fy11_psgp_kit.pdf for more information about Port Security 
Grants.
41 The US Coast Guard’s MSRAM tool includes maritime CIKR in all eighteen DHS CIKR sectors.
42 Computing power would likely also be necessary for quantifying deterrence effects of investments, when multiple 
attack modes for the targets under consideration are modeled. Our example only assumes one attack mode (boat 
bomb).
43 Port Security Grants could be used to reduce consequences as well, to add deterrent value. Overseas military 
operations and counterterrorism actions are examples of actions that mitigate attacker capabilities.
44 Across all attacker options means the attacker uses the same attack mode (boat bomb), but could attack different 
combinations of CIKR. Since we don’t use the traditional Nash Equilibrium to find the optimal attacker choice after 
we invest to deter, we need to aggregate resulting risk across all attacker choices.
45 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Science 211 
(1981): 453-458.
46 Lisa J. Carlson and Ramond Dacey, “Sequential Analysis of Deterrence Games with a Declining Status Quo,” 
Conflict Management and Peace Science 23 (2006): 181-198.
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 by  the author(s).  Homeland Security Affairs is  an  academic 
journal  available free of charge to individuals  and institutions. Because the purpose 
of this publication  is the widest possible dissemination  of knowledge, copies of this 
journal  and the articles contained herein  may be printed or  downloaded and 
redistributed for  personal, research  or educational purposes free of  charge and 
without permission. Any commercial  use of Homeland Security Affairs or  the 
articles published herein is expressly prohibited without the written consent of  the 
copyright  holder. The copyright of all  articles  published in Homeland Security 
Affairs  rests with the author(s) of the article. Homeland Security Affairs is the 
online journal of the Naval  Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security (CHDS).
http://www.hsaj.org
TAQUECHEL AND LEWIS, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RISK  28
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 12 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
